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Abstract: Using a Bayesian learning model with heterogeneity across agents, our study 
aims to identify the relative importance of alternative pathways through which 
professional forecasters disagree and reach consensus on the term structure of inflation 
and real GDP forecasts, resulting in different patterns of forecast accuracy. Forecast 
disagreement arises from two primary sources in our model: differences in the initial 
prior beliefs, and differences in the interpretation of new public information. Estimated 
model parameters, together with two separate case studies on (i) the dynamics of forecast 
disagreement in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S. and (ii) the 
successful inflation targeting experience in Italy after 1997, firmly establish the 
importance of these two pathways to expert disagreement, and help to explain the relative 
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An analysis of forecast revisions and their cross-sectional dispersion can reveal important 
information on how efficiently and uniformly forecasters react to new information. Using 
monthly fixed-target survey forecasts for real GDP, Lahiri and Sheng (2008) estimated a 
Bayesian learning model aimed at explaining the role of initial priors in forecast 
disagreement and its evolution over various horizons. In this paper we extend our 
analysis to both real GDP and inflation forecasts using more recent data, and explain 
certain important differences in the way professional forecasters treat these two variables 
and succeed in producing multi-period forecasts. We find that while predicting inflation, 
compared to real GDP, professional forecasters (i) make smaller forecast errors; (ii) 
disagree to a lesser extent; and (iii) start revising their forecasts much earlier. Even 
though the first of these results has been implicit in most studies of forecast evaluation,
1 
none of these empirical results are well articulated in the forecasting literature.  
 
At least a part of the explanation for the superior forecasting record of some 
variables has to lie in the nature of their data generating processes. In reality, however, 
the predictability can be improved by incorporating additional information from diverse 
sources and using more complicated models. The forecasters in real time face additional 
uncertainty due to data revisions and the possibility of breaks due to unstable data 
generating processes. Also, one may rightfully ask why the data generating processes 
differ between variables. To understand these issues more comprehensively, we need to 
explore also the underlying expectation formation processes and the role of individual 
heterogeneity in incorporating new information. Using a Bayesian information processing 
framework, our study aims to identify the relative importance of alternative pathways 
through which professional forecasters adapt to new information and determine the term 
structure of forecasts, resulting in different patterns of forecast accuracy.  
 
We find that experts start off with widely divergent initial prior beliefs at very long 
horizons. Their initial beliefs propagate forward into the whole series of forecasts, 
generating a significant amount of inertia in expectations formation. This “anchoring” 
like effect, much emphasized in the psychological literature, is a result of optimal 
Bayesian information processing that efficiently combines initial priors with new 
information, see Zellner (2002). However, our analysis shows that there is more 
pervasive stickiness in the recorded real GDP forecasts than in the inflation forecasts due 
to inefficient use of new information. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some stylized facts 
based on the cross-country forecast data. In section 3, we explore the data generating 
processes of the target variables. In section 4, we estimate the Bayesian learning model 
and present empirical evidence on the alternative pathways to generate disagreement. 
This section also presents two case studies on (i) the dynamics of forecast disagreement 
after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S., and (ii) the inflation targeting experience in Italy 
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after 1997. We investigate forecast efficiency in utilizing public information for both real 
GDP and inflation in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Some stylized facts 
 
This section starts with a brief introduction of the data used in our analysis. We then 
highlight a few stylized facts concerning the evolution of consensus forecasts, forecast 
accuracy, forecast disagreement and forecast revisions in real GDP and inflation. We find 





The data for this study are taken from “Consensus Forecasts: A Digest of International 
Economic Forecasts”, published by Consensus Economics Inc. We study a panel of 
forecasts of annual real GDP growth and inflation. The survey respondents start 
forecasting in January of the previous year, and their last forecast is reported at the 
beginning of December of the target year. So for each country and target year, we have 
24 forecasts of varying horizons. Our data start with the January 1990 forecasts and end 
with the December 2007 forecasts, giving predictions for 17 target years 1991 - 2007 and 
for seven major industrialized (G7) countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States.
2 Inflation is measured by the annual 
percentage change in consumer price index for all G7 countries except the United 
Kingdom.
3 The forecasting institutions, numbering from 20 to 40, are typically banks, 
securities firms, econometric modelers, industrial corporations and independent 
forecasters. Thus, they are all professional private market forecasters. Since most of the 
institutions are located in the countries for which they are forecasting, country-specific 
expertise is guaranteed. Altogether we have more than 115,000 forecasts for real GDP 
and inflation. In the following analysis, we use an early announcement as the actual 
value, which is published in the May issues of Consensus Forecasts immediately 
following the target year.  
 
For the current study, this data set has many advantages over some other more 
commonly used surveys. First, Consensus Forecasts are regularly sold in a wide variety 
of markets, and the names of the respondents are published next to their forecasts. Hence, 
one would expect these professional forecasts to satisfy a certain level of accuracy, in 
contrast to laymen expectations, as poor forecasts damage reputation. Second, since the 
importance of private information in forecasting GDP and inflation is expected to be very 
small compared to such variables as corporate earnings, company stock prices, etc., we 
can identify the news to GDP and inflation as mostly public information. Finally, 
forecasts for fairly long horizons, currently from 24- to 1-month ahead, are available. 
                                                 
2 Note that the target for GDP and inflation in Germany changes in our data sample due to unification. We 
use forecasts for West Germany made for the target years 1991-1995, and for unified Germany for the 
target years 1996-2007. 
3 For the UK, the inflation rate is based on Retail Price Index (RPI). However from April 1997 forecasts are 
solicited for RPI excluding mortgage interest costs.  4 
 
This fixed-event scheme enables us to study the role of heterogeneity in initial priors and 
their effects on expert disagreement for a sequence of 24 forecasts for 17 target years.  
 
2.2 Evolution of forecast accuracy over horizons 
 
We plot in Figure 1 the average root mean squared forecast errors (RMSE) for real GDP 
and inflation using individual data during 1991-2007. Two findings stand out. First, 
compared to inflation, professional forecasters make larger forecast errors in real GDP at 
all observed horizons. This finding is consistent with most studies of forecast evaluation. 
Second, the RMSE for real GDP at horizons 24-18 months often stays relatively flat, but 
for inflation it steadily declines from the beginning (i.e.  24 = h ). This latter finding has 
not been explored in the forecasting literature. 
 
2.3 Evolution of consensus forecasts  
 
Next, we examine the plots of consensus (i.e. mean) forecasts and the realized actual 
values of real GDP and inflation over 1991-2007. These plots start when the forecast 
horizon is 24, which is reported in January of the previous year, and end when the 
forecast horizon is 0, which gives the actual realization.
4  
 
First, as can be found from these plots, for the first few rounds of forecasting (for 
horizons 24 to 18 months) and for the majority of the years and countries, the consensus 
forecasts do not seem to change very much - more so for real GPD than for inflation. This 
empirical observation leads us to believe that, over these horizons, forecasters do not 
receive much dependable information to revise their forecasts systematically. Second, the 
initial 24-month ahead forecasts for all countries seem to be starting from a relatively 
narrow band and then, as information is accumulated, they tend to diverge from these 
initial starting points and move toward their final destinations. Thus, the variability of 
mean forecasts over the target years is very small at the longer horizons, and increases 
rapidly as the forecast horizon gets shorter. Note also that the initial inflation forecasts 
seem to be bunched together more than the initial GDP forecasts, and have become less 
variable toward the latter part of the sample. 
 
All in all, a close look at these graphs reveals certain regularities in how the fixed-
target consensus forecasts evolve over time. We now proceed to examine more rigorously 
the underlying dynamics in forecaster disagreement around these consensus forecasts and 
the timing of the arrival of important information when forecasters break away from their 
initial estimates. The dynamics of forecast disagreement contains important information 
about the sources of forecast inefficiency.  
 
2.4 Evolution of forecast disagreement 
 
                                                 
4To save space, these graphs are not reported here, and can be found in our working paper at 
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Following the literature, we measure forecast disagreement as the variance of forecasts 
across professional forecasters.
5 In order to study the general pattern of forecast 
disagreement over horizons, we plot the average disagreement over 17 target years at 
each of the 24 forecast horizons for GDP and inflation forecasts in Figure 2. Although the 
magnitude of the disagreement varies a lot across countries (France, Italy and Germany 
have comparatively low disagreements), the extent of disagreement among professional 
forecasters is less on the average in predicting inflation than GDP.
6 For GDP forecasts, 
the disagreement at the 24-month horizon is very high and stays almost unchanged or 
declines only slightly until about the 16-month horizon; thereafter it starts to decrease 
sharply at the 15-month horizon and keeps declining as the horizon gets shorter. For 
inflation forecasts the disagreement is also relatively high at the beginning, but unlike for 
real GDP, declines monotonically as the horizon gets shorter from 24 months to 1 month.    
 
2.5 Evolution of forecast revisions over horizons 
 
With fixed-target forecasts, an analysis of forecast revisions gives us critical information 
about when major public information arrives, when it is processed, and the extent to 
which experts interpret the information differently. Let  ith F  be the forecast of the target 
variable made by agent i, for the target year t, and h months ahead of the end of the target 
year. Forecast revision is defined as the difference between two successive forecasts for 
the same individual i and the same target year t, i.e.  1 + − = ith ith ith F F R . The decomposition 
of the total sum of squares of forecast revisions into between- and within-agent variations 
reveals important characteristics of forecasts in the aggregate. In this context, we 
introduce three measures, within-agent variation (
w
h S ), between-agent variation (
b
h S ) and 
total variation (
t
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5 In our study sample where only more frequent respondents were included, the inter-quartile range and 
variance of individual forecasts were found to be very similar, cf. Döpke and Fritsche (2006). 
6 Note that for the UK, if we ignore the initial two years and 1994-96 during which the definition of the 
price variable was changed, the disagreement for inflation at h=24 will be much smaller than that for real 
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who responded less than 10% of the time are deleted from our forecast revision analysis 
such that our results are not dominated by very few extreme observations. By 
construction, the total variation in forecast revisions is the sum of within-agent and 






h S S S + =   
 
Depending on the horizon, country and the target variable, we find that between-
agent variation explains 4% to 34% of the total variation in forecast revisions.
7 Over all 
horizons, between-agent variation accounts for 10%-15% and 12%-17% of the total 
variations in GDP and inflation forecasts on the average, respectively. This variation 
across agents can be attributed to different prior beliefs and to differential interpretation 
of the same public information. The between-agent variation, however, is relatively 
small, with the total variation in forecast revision being mainly driven by within-agent 
variation. This is not unexpected because our forecasters are professional experts, and the 
targets are widely discussed macroeconomic entities.  
 
Because of its relative size, we should also be interested in the evolution of within-
agent variation over horizons. Note that within-agent variation is the average across-time 
variation of forecast revisions at each monthly horizon. Figures 3a and 3b plot the total 
variation and its components in real GDP and inflation forecast revisions, respectively. 
Whenever we see a big jump in within-agent variation at a certain horizon, it means 
professional forecasters make major revisions at that specific horizon.  
 
For GDP forecasts, the first big spike is observed at horizon 15 for all sampled 
countries, which simply suggests that professional forecasters observe the first relevant 
public signal and revise their forecasts at the beginning of October of the previous year. 
Depending on the timing of their base-year GDP announcements, within-agent variation 
gets a boost again at horizons 11 to 9 months, which, as expected, affects the forecasts for 
year-over-year growth rate. As the forecast horizon declines, within-agent variation gets a 
boost whenever the first release of GDP growth for the previous quarter becomes 
available.  
 
As for inflation forecasts, we also observe a big spike in within-agent variation 
around horizon 15 for all sampled countries. It is remarkable that for both inflation and 
real GDP, a substantial forecast revision takes place at this horizon.
8 However, for 
inflation, professional forecasters start making major forecast revisions much earlier, 
which are discernible at horizon 22 for Canada, Germany and the UK and 18 for other G7 
countries except Italy, which has its highest peak at the 15-month horizon. Recent 
research by Banerjee and Marcellino (2006), Gurkaynak et al. (2007) and others have 
documented that numerous monthly indicators are regularly utilized by market 
forecasters to gauge future expectations of these macro variables. As the horizon gets 
shorter, within-agent variation gets boosts whenever some relevant information becomes 
available concerning inflation for the target year, including quarterly IPD 
announcements, various monthly variables and leading indicators. It is interesting to note 
                                                 
7 The detailed tabulations can be found in http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266219. 
8 One might have thought that the most important revision will take place at around h=11 when the last 
year’s actual value is known, cf. Patton and Timmermann (2007).   7 
 
that even for inflation, forecasters do not seem to revise forecasts uniformly every month. 
This gives some credence to the hypothesis put forward by Mankiw et al. (2003) that 
forecasters do not update information on a continuous basis.   
 
3. Exploring the data generating processes 
 
We find that, historically, real GDP has been a much more difficult variable to predict 
than inflation.
9 One may think that this can be attributed to the variability of the 
underlying series. However, it is not the variability, but rather the predictability of the 
target variable that is one of the important factors in the analysis. This is the focus of this 
section. 
 
Following Galbraith (2003) and Galbraith and Tkacz (2007), we calculate the 
forecast content and content horizons for quarterly GDP and monthly inflation rates for 
all seven countries in our sample over 1990-2007. The forecast content is defined as the 
proportionate gain in the mean squared forecast error (MSE) from the best fitting 
autoregressive model over the unconditional mean of the series as the benchmark. The 
forecast content horizon is defined as the horizon beyond which the forecast content is 
close to zero. Galbraith (2003) has characterized the content function of AR(p) models 
analytically, taking into account the uncertainty associated with parameter estimation. We 
allow p to be no greater than 4 for quarterly GDP data, and 8 for monthly inflation data. 
The value of p is chosen by the Schwarz information criterion, using an upper bound. The 
benchmark values were the unconditional means of the individual series during 1990-
2007. All the data used in this section are downloaded from DataStream. 
 
The results of the estimation of forecast content functions are presented in Figures 4a 
and 4b for GDP and inflation, respectively. For annual GDP growth using quarterly data, 
the forecast content becomes less than 0.05 when the horizon exceeds six quarters. 
However, for annual inflation using monthly data, the corresponding forecast content 
horizons are much longer. For Germany and Italy, the content horizon extends beyond 36 
months; for other G7 countries, it is around 24 months. These findings are consistent with 
the results reported in Galbraith (2003) who has looked at the predictability of GDP and 
inflation for Canada and the United States.  
 
We should point out that our forecast content functions are based purely on linear 
autoregressive models of the target variables. In reality, forecast content and 
predictability can be and possibly are improved upon by incorporating additional 
information and using more complicated models.
10 In addition, the forecast content 
functions are typically estimated using currently available revised data. For variables like 
real GDP that goes through substantial amount of data revisions, its predictability in real 
time can be quite different. Since the variance of the early revisions of a variable is 
necessarily less than that of the revised series, the predictability of a series may seem to 
                                                 
9 This is despite the fact that the trend component in inflation has become less predictable in recent years, 
see Stock and Watson (2007). See also Mishkin (2007). 
10 Galbraith and Tkacz (2007) have, however, found that forecast horizons do not improve even when 
dynamic factor models with many predictors are used in place of simple univariate autoregressive models. 8 
 
be less attractive than what one may get using real time data. In that sense, the forecast 
content from the simple AR model provides an overall lower bound on the true 
predictability of a series. For real GDP, Croushore (2006) reports mixed evidence on the 
effect of data revisions on predictability, depending on the sample period. Since data 
revisions are relatively small for inflation, they have very little effect on predictability. In 
our analysis, the relative ranking of different countries in terms of RMSE does not match 
the relative ranking of those in terms of forecast content horizons as one obtains from 
Galbraith’s method for either of the variables. The ranking can also depend on the 
specific benchmark used in the analysis. Thus it is necessary to study the predictability of 
real GDP and inflation by professional forecasters in real time with respect to a more 
natural benchmark.  
 
Following Diebold and Kilian (2001), we define a skill score  24 , s p  as the 
proportionate MSE gain in the s-month ahead forecast over the initial forecast made at 24 
months ahead as the naïve benchmark, i.e.,  ) / ( 1 24 24 , MSE MSE p s s − = , where  s MSE  is 
the mean squared error for horizon  23 ,..., 2 , 1 = s .
11 The measure of predictability  24 , s p  
provides the improvement in the forecasts of a target variable at the forecast horizon s 
with respect to its predictability at the 24-month horizon as the horizon decreases. Thus 
variables with different variances and forecast difficulties can be naturally compared 
using  24 , s p . The large values of  24 , s p  imply that forecasts made at horizon s improve 
significantly over 24-month ahead benchmark forecast.    
 
Figure 5 plots the statistic  24 , s p  for GDP and inflation forecasts for all seven 
countries. It is clear that, for most countries, the inflation content function dominates that 
for real GDP, meaning that as the horizon shortens, useful information is more promptly 
absorbed in inflation forecasts. The dominance of inflation forecasts is considerably 
noteworthy for Canada, France, Japan and the UK. We also find that the wedge is 
particularly larger at the longer horizons, echoing earlier evidence that during the first 6-8 
rounds of forecasting, the real GDP forecasts do not add any value. For inflation 
forecasts, however, each additional month increases the information content of the 
forecasts over the previous month even at longer horizons. This provides additional 
evidence in support of the conclusion that real GDP is inherently more difficult to 
forecast than inflation, and documents that our professional forecasters have been more 
successful in processing relevant information in predicting inflation than real GDP. As 
the horizon falls from  24 = h  to  1 = h , the mean squared error with inflation forecasts 
decreases substantially, causing the skill score  24 , s p  to approach 100% at a faster rate 
than that of real GDP. 
 
4. Understanding the individual forecasts 
 
To understand more fully the relative forecasting record of real GDP and inflation, one 
has to explore their underlying expectations generating processes and recognize that the 
                                                 
11 A similar measure has been used in Öller and Teterukowsky (2007). 9 
 
ability and willingness of individual forecasters to absorb new information at different 
forecast horizons can be different depending on the nature of the target variable. These 
possibilities are formally explored in this section where we develop a simple Bayesian 
learning model aimed at identifying the relative importance of alternative pathways 
through which professional forecasters predict the term structure of  forecasts, resulting 
in certain patterns of forecast accuracy. 
 
4.1 The model 
 
We have seen that in predicting real GDP, professional forecasters do not seem to adjust 
their initial forecasts much and sustain their initial disagreement during the initial rounds 
of forecasting.
12 We also noted that at long horizons, consensus forecasts vary very little 
over time since the idiosyncratic components in each year’s forecasts cancel out while 
averaging over forecasters. Our Bayesian model explicitly recognizes these twin facts and 




In thinking about why professional forecasters disagree regarding their long-run 
forecasts, note that a wealth of historical information on GDP and inflation are publicly 
available to all forecasters to estimate the long-run unconditional values of the series. 
Thus, it is not the availability of relevant data but the models, methods and philosophies 
used to interpret them that are different from one forecaster to another. This is consistent 
with the findings in Döpke and Fritsche (2006) that forecasters do not share a common 
belief about what is an adequate model of the economy. Due to the length of the 
forecasting horizon, experts face very high uncertainty in interpreting available 
information based on whatever model or judgment they are using, and hence disagree a 
lot about GDP and inflation in the long- or medium-run, see, Zarnowitz and Lambros 
(1987).  
 
Accordingly, we assume that the initial prior belief of the target variable for the year 
t, held by the forecaster i, at the 24-month horizon,  24 ˆ
it F , is represented by 
) , ( ~ ˆ 1
24 24 24
−
it it it a F N F  for  , ,..., 1 N i =   T t ,..., 1 = , where  24 it F  and  24 it a  are the mean and the 
precision of agent i’s initial prior belief, respectively.
14 
 
                                                 
12 In case of inflation, meaningful updating seems to begin at horizons slightly longer than 24 months.  
13 Even though 24-month ahead forecasts are strictly medium-run forecasts, there is some evidence that 
suggests that these forecasts are in fact very close to being long-run forecasts. In Figures 6a and 6b we have 
pitted 10-year forecasts of real GDP and inflation for the US, obtained from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) of Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, against 24-month ahead forecasts from our 
Consensus Forecasts database during 1992-2006. The corresponding disagreements are also reported. To 
match the timing of forecasts we compare the February forecasts of Consensus Forecasts with the first 
quarter forecasts from SPF (that are reported in the middle of the quarter). Even though, as expected, the 
variations in 10-year long-run expectations are slightly muted, the two series are remarkably similar in 
terms of mean values of forecasts and the disagreement measures. 
14 The precisions of initial prior beliefs are allowed to be different across forecasters. This assumption is 
corroborated by the recent studies using density forecasts that document the heterogeneity in forecast 
uncertainty, see, for example, Lahiri and Liu (2006), Bowles et al. (2007), and Boero et al. (2008).  10 
 
With the arrival of new public information, experts progressively learn over horizons 
to modify their initial beliefs. Consistent with our broad empirical findings on the fixed-
target forecasts, we assume that, at horizon h, forecasters receive public signal  th L  
concerning the target variable but may not interpret it identically. In particular, individual 
i’s estimate,  ith Y , of the target variable, conditional only on the new public signal that is 
observed at forecast horizon h, can be written as  ) , ( ~
1 − − ith ith th ith b L N Y µ . Note that  ith Y  is 
not observed.  
 
This assumption allows for the possibility that agents can interpret the same public 
signal differently, which is captured by  ith µ  with associated uncertainty  ith b . At each 
month, all agents observe a new public signal but disagree on its effect for the target year. 
One expert can interpret the signal more optimistically or pessimistically than another. 
The precision of public information  ith b  allows individual forecasters some latitude in 
interpreting public signals, and is a key parameter in generating expert disagreement and 
also forecast accuracy, see, Acemoglu et al. (2006). This is in line with the empirical 
evidence presented above about significant between-agent variation in forecast revisions, 
and also with a large finance literature that equally informed agents can interpret the 
same information differently (cf. Kandel and Zilberfarb, 1999; Dominitz and Manski, 
2005).  
 
Bayes rule implies that under the normality assumption, agent i’s posterior mean is 
the weighted average of his prior mean and his estimate of the target variable conditional 
only on new public signal: 
 
) )( 1 ( 1 ith th ith ith ith ith L F F µ λ λ − − + = + ,        ( 4 )  
 
with his posterior precision  ith ith ith b a a + = +1 , where  ) /( 1 1 ith ith ith ith b a a + = + + λ  is the weight 
attached to prior beliefs.  
 
For convenience, the following population parameters are defined across 
professional forecasters for target year t at horizon h: 
 
th ith i F F E = ) (,  
2 ) ( var th F ith i F σ = ;        ( 5 )  
th ith i E λ λ = ) (,  
2 ) ( var th ith i λ σ λ = ; 
th ith i E µ µ = ) (,  
2 ) ( var th ith i µ σ µ = . 
 
Since we expect that the prior mean  1 + ith F  is independent of the prior precision  1 + ith a , 
we can safely assume that,  1 + ith F ,  ith λ  and  ith µ  are mutually independent of each other for 
any  t and h. Lahiri and Sheng (2008) derived the following relationship between 
disagreement in two consecutive rounds of fixed-target forecasting:  
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
2 )] 1 /( [ ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( th th th th th th th th th F th F F λ σ λ σ σ λ σ σ σ λ λ µ λ − ∆ + − + + + = + , (6) 11 
 
 
where  1 + − = ∆ th th th F F F . In (6) the dynamics of forecast disagreement over horizons is 
seen to be governed by three parameters of the model representing across-forecaster 
differences in (i) prior beliefs, 
2
1 + th F σ ; (ii) the weights attached to priors, 
2
th λ σ  and (iii) 
the interpretation of  public signals, 
2
th µ σ . It encompasses a number of special cases. In 
one case where all agents attach the same weight to their prior beliefs relative to the 
reliability of the sample information (i.e.  0








Let us first focus on estimating one of our structural parameters - the weight attached to 
prior belief relative to the reliability of the sample information. Equation (4) shows that   
 
ith ith ith ith F F ε λ + = +1 ,          ( 8 )  
 
where  ) )( 1 ( ith th ith ith L µ λ ε − − =  is the error term. By construction,  ith ε  and  1 + ith F  are 
independent for any t and h. In estimating the above equation, several econometric issues 
arise.  
 
First, note that (8) is not estimable, since the number of parameters to be estimated 
exceeds the number of observations. We assume  
 
ih h ih ith v + = = λ λ λ ,          ( 9 )  
 
where  ih v  has mean zero, mutually independent of each other, and independent over 
forecast horizons. We regress the forecast revision ( ith F ∆ ) on the lagged forecast ( 1 + ith F ) 
to circumvent the possible problem of spurious regression. Thus, the estimable version of 
(8) becomes 
 
ith ith h ith u F F + = ∆ +1 β ,          ( 1 0 )    
 
where  1 − = h h λ β  and  1 + + = ith ih ith ith F v u ε .  
 
Second,  ith u  will be correlated across forecasters because, conditional on t and h, it 
has a nonzero mean that depends on  th L . To solve this problem, we rewrite (10) as 
 
1 1 + + − − ∆ = ith ih ith h ith ith F v F F β ε .         ( 1 1 )    
 
Taking expectations of (11) over i conditional on t and h, we get 12 
 
 
1 ) ( + − ∆ = th h th ith i F F E β ε .         ( 1 2 )    
 
Subtracting (12) from (11), we obtain 
 
ith th ith h th ith w F F F F + − = ∆ − ∆ + + ) ( 1 1 β ,        ( 1 3 )  
  
where  1 ) ( + + − = ith ih ith i ith ith F v E w ε ε . In contrast to  ith u  in (10), the error  ith w  has a zero 
mean now.  
 
Third, it may seem desirable to estimate the panel data model in (13) with all three 
dimensions by imposing some smooth functional form for  h β  over horizons as in 
Gregory and Yetman (2004). However, as shown later, the estimated  h β  varies unevenly 
over horizons, depending on the lumpiness and timing of public information arrival. 
 
Finally,  ith w  might be serially correlated. Let  ith w  follow the AR(1) process 
ith ith h ith w w η ρ + = +1 , then (13) can be rewritten as 
 




) ( ' ' ' ) ( i h t i ith E η σ η η = , for  ' , ' , ' h h t t i i = = =  and 0 otherwise. Using nonlinear least 
squares, we estimate (14) for each horizon after controlling for the heterogeneity in the 
error term.  
 
Tables 1a and 1b present the estimated weights attached to public information for 
GDP and inflation forecasts, respectively. In predicting both real GDP and inflation, 
forecasters give a lower weight to public information at longer horizons because of its 
low perceived quality, and a higher weight at short horizons as information becomes 
more precise. At longer horizons, initial priors are relatively more important. Another 
important observation is that, on average over all horizons, professional forecasters attach 
a higher weight to public information in predicting inflation than GDP. Recall that from 
(4), the relative weight attached to public information is a function of the precisions of 
new information and priors, i.e.  ) / 1 /( ) / ( ) /( 1 1 1 1 + + + + = + = − ith ith ith ith ith ith ith ith a b a b b a b λ . It 
immediately follows that the ratio of the precision of new information to the precision of 
prior belief,  1 / + ith ith a b  is higher, and thus public information is perceived to be more 
precise and certain in predicting inflation than GDP. This finding can possibly be 
explained by the fact that initial GDP announcements are more heavily revised than price 
indexes, observed only quarterly, and involve substantial measurement errors. The 
repeated arrival of substantial real GDP revisions in real time make all “news” related to 
GDP less precise, and hence GDP forecasts tilt away from the proper use of current 
information.  On the contrary, retail price index for the UK is never revised after its initial 
release, and hence will have no such bias. Also, more frequent communication of the 
latest inflationary developments to the general public and the commitment to long-run 13 
 
price stability by central banks may make adjustments to inflationary expectations more 
dependent on current news, and less on initial priors.  
 
4.3 The role of initial prior beliefs 
 
Recall that forecast disagreement is posited to have three components, see equation (6). 
Lahiri and Sheng (2008) find the second component, i.e. differences in the weights 
attached by experts to their prior beliefs, to barely have any effect on GDP forecast 
disagreement, since professional forecasters place very similar weights on their prior 
beliefs.
15 We thus maintain a more parsimonious model in which forecast disagreement 
arises from two possible sources: differences in their initial prior beliefs, and differences 
in their interpretation of public information as in equation (7).  
 
Substituting  h λ ˆ  into (7), we get estimates for the heterogeneity parameter in the 
interpretation of public signals, 
2
h µ σ , as the sample average of 
2 2
1
2 2 ) ˆ 1 /( ) ˆ ( h th F h th F λ σ λ σ − − +  
over target years. Note that differences in interpreting pubic information affect forecast 
disagreement only through its interaction with the weight attached to public information.  
 
With the estimates of parameters in hand, we can check how well the disagreement 
predicted by our model matches the disagreement observed in the survey data. 
Substituting the parameter estimates of  h λ  and 
2
h µ σ  into 
 


























t F j th F µ µ σ λ λ σ λ σ λ σ ,     (15) 
 
we get the dynamically generated forecast disagreement at each horizon that is predicted 
by our model. 
 
We find that, depending on the country, our estimated model explains from about 
20% to 56% of the total variation in observed GDP forecast disagreement over all target 
years and horizons. The corresponding figures for inflation forecasts are much higher, 
ranging from 40% to 74%.
16 It is interesting to note that, using a dynamic structural time 
series model with measurement errors and assuming forecast efficiency, Patton and 
Timmermann (2007) could mimic the dispersion in the term structure of US real GDP 
forecasts successfully, but not of inflation at the short horizons. We face a similar 
problem only for Italy’s inflation forecast dispersion at very short horizons. As found in 
section 5, this can be explained by the fact that forecasters in Italy overweight public 
information at these short horizons. Considering the fact that forecast disagreement varies 
a lot from year to year for any specific horizon due to various exogenous factors (e.g., 
                                                 
15 This component, however, might account for a large part of the disagreement in laymen’s expectations.  
16 For GDP forecasts, our model explains about 56%, 29%, 50%, 20%, 27%, 54% and 50% of the total 
variation in observed forecast disagreement over the target years and horizons in Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, respectively. The corresponding figures for inflation forecasts are 59%, 
40%, 68%, 52%, 56%, 74% and 72%, respectively. 14 
 
recessions, 9/11, Katrina, policy actions, etc.) and that our theoretical model is meant to 
explain only the term structure of forecasts, the estimated model does a good job 
explaining the evolution of the disagreement over target years and horizons - admittedly 
more so for inflation than for GDP forecasts.  
 
  The contribution of heterogeneity in (updated) prior beliefs in explaining 
disagreement in GDP and inflation forecasts is presented in Figure 7. With a few 
exceptions, the diversity in their priors plays a larger role in explaining expert 
disagreement in forecasting GDP than in forecasting inflation. As expected, the 
importance of the initial prior belief steadily declines, as forecast horizons get shorter. 
But even at the end of forecasting rounds, 1-month ahead, the diversity in the updated 
priors still explains about 14% - 47% in GDP and 25% - 38% in inflation forecast 
disagreement. This finding firmly establishes the role of heterogeneity in the initial prior 
beliefs in generating inter-personal differences in individual forecasts over the whole 
term structure. Patton and Timmermann (2007) have also established the role of initial 
priors in their study of disagreement in US GDP and inflation forecasts, but found little 
effect of differential information.  
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In (16) the optimal forecast made at horizon h is a weighted average of three components: 
the initial prior beliefs, current public information, and all past public information. The 
initial prior belief causes expectation stickiness in two ways. First, it enters into the 
current forecast directly and is propagated forward into the whole series of forecasts for 
the target year, though its importance declines over horizons. This is consistent with the 
findings in Batchelor (2007) that biases due to optimism or pessimism in the initial priors 
persist throughout the forecasting cycle. Second, it allows all past public information to 
affect the current forecast in a staggered way. Without the role of prior beliefs (i.e. 
0 = ith λ  for all h), the current forecast reflects only the latest information about the target 
variable. Thus, stickiness of expectations in itself does not necessarily contradict the 
forecast efficiency hypothesis. Instead the Bayesian learning model allows for certain 
amount of inertia in expectations and thus offers an additional cue to the ongoing 
discussion on the micro foundation of expectation stickiness (cf. Mankiw and Reis, 2006; 
Morris and Shin, 2006).  
 
4.4 The role of heterogeneity in the interpretation of new public information 
 
Apart from the diversity in initial prior beliefs, a second factor that explains forecast 
disagreement in our model is the heterogeneity in the interpretation of new public 
information by experts. As Tables 1a and 1b reveal, the latter pathway becomes 
increasingly more important at shorted horizons, and provide evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that equally informed agents can sometimes interpret the same public 
information differently. In sub-section 4.4.1, we present a case study of the 9/11 terrorist 15 
 
attack on the US that will firmly establish the role of this channel in generating expert 
disagreement. In sub-section 4.4.2, we present another interesting case study on the 
Italian inflation targeting regime where the monetary authority successfully reduced 
inflation forecast disagreement first by anchoring the long-term expectations within a 
very narrow range and then limiting the heterogeneity in the interpretation of incoming 
news over the term structure of forecasts.  
 
4.4.1 The impact of 9/11 terrorist attack on forecast disagreement: a case study 
 
As aforementioned in section 2, we expect private information about GDP and inflation 
to be of limited importance relative to public information. However, we cannot rule out 
the possibility of the arrivals of public and private information simultaneously. In this 
section, we study the evolution of forecast disagreement in the aftermath of September 
11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. This event provides an example to establish the 
importance of the differential interpretation of public information in generating forecast 
disagreement, where any confounding role of either prior beliefs or private information 
can be ruled out. Patton and Timmermann (2007) have also looked at the evolution of 
consensus forecasts around 9/11, but with a different purpose.  
 
Figure 8 plots the effect of 9/11 on the evolution of GDP forecast disagreement. The 
horizontal axis shows the month/year when forecasts were made. The upper and lower 
panels trace (solid lines) disagreement in experts’ forecasts made for the current year and 
the next year respectively at different months from January 2001-December 2002.  Since 
disagreement, ceteris paribus, is higher for longer horizon forecasts, we have also plotted 
the average disagreement (dotted lines) over 1991-2000 for each monthly horizon for the 
purpose of benchmark comparison. Thus the effect of the 9/11 attack on disagreement 
will be the vertical difference between the solid and dotted lines.  
 
Let us first focus on forecast disagreement in predicting current year’s GDP growth 
for 2001 (upper panel). Prior to 9/11, expert disagreement was a little higher compared to 
the ten-year historical average possibly due to the recession that started on March 2001. 
Immediately following 9/11, however, the disagreement did not increase during the 
October-December 2001 forecasts. There are two obvious reasons. First, since we are 
considering current-year GDP growth, with three months remaining, even a big shock can 
have only a limited effect on the current year’s growth. Second, the total impact of a 
shock is sure to be distributed over time, and three months is too short a period to capture 
the total impact. Thus, when the horizon is very short, the impact of an unexpected shock 
on forecast disagreement will be accordingly small. Turning to forecast disagreement in 
predicting current year’s GDP growth for 2002, however, we find some elevated extra 
amount of disagreement during the January-May 2002, compared to the historical values 
of these months. The disagreement doubled to 0.34 in January 2002. It then took an 
additional 4 months for the disagreement to get back to its historical level. We may note 
that during this period, the consensus real GDP forecast increased from 0.9% in January 
2002 to 2.8% in May 2002, as the economy was recovering from the recession. 
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The lower panel is more interesting and plots forecast disagreement in predicting 
next year’s GDP growth rates for 2002 and 2003. The disagreement was remarkably 
close to the historical average prior to 9/11 despite the recession. The disagreement then 
more than tripled to 0.60 in October 2001 and, compared to the historical average, stayed 
high until January 2002.
17 But the disagreement quickly fell back to the historical level in 
another few months, suggesting that the impact of a shock on forecast disagreement is 
also small when the horizon is very long. The revisions to next year’s growth forecasts 
were just the opposite of that for the disagreement during October 2001-May 2002 – 
growth forecasts were downgraded as the disagreement rose and vice versa. Our results 
suggest that an unanticipated shock tends to have the maximum impact on yearly GDP 
forecasts and dispersions, if it comes during the middle horizons when there are 14 to 10 
months remaining to the end of the target year. The extra disagreement takes nearly 4-5 
months to dissipate to its historical levels. Isiklar and Lahiri (2007) and Isiklar et al. 
(2006) found very similar results on the response pattern of mean forecasts to shocks 
using VAR analysis.  
 
There are two antecedents to the present case study. Mankiw et al. (2003) studied the 
evolution of forecast distribution as part of learning by households after a regime change 
due to the Volker disinflation policy during 1979-82. In another classic paper, Kandel 
and Pearson (1995) established the importance of heterogeneity in the interpretation of 
public information by looking at analysts’ forecasts before and after earnings 
announcements. However, they could not rule out the possibility of the simultaneous 
arrivals of the private and public information about the value of the announcement. We 
circumvent this problem by looking at a fully unanticipated but universally observed 
common shock. The only reason why experts disagreed in this case is that they used 
different models and methods, and interpreted the effect of this event on the economy 
differentially. Differential interpretation of public information can be a great challenge 
for establishing the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policies - an issue that we 
examine more carefully next.  
 
4.4.2 Italy under inflation targeting: another case study 
 
In 1998, the Governing Council of the ECB interpreted the Maastricht Treaty as a 
mandate to maintain price inflation close to 2% over the medium term. In recent years a 
number of studies have concluded that, due to official inflation targeting policies of the 
central banks in Europe and Canada, long-run inflation expectations have become more 
anchored in these countries compared to those in the United States. Beechey et al. (2007) 
have used survey data from the ECB and the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank to show 
that during 2000-2006, the disagreement in long-run inflation expectations in the euro 
area has been lower than in the US. Note that our model implies that the effect of 
inflation targeting on the initial prior beliefs will be transmitted to expert disagreement 
over the whole term structure of forecasts via the Bayesian updating process. Since 
Italy’s performance in achieving price stability in recent years has been particularly 
                                                 
17 It is interesting to note that we did not find any significant impact of 9/11 on the evolution of the 
consensus forecast and disagreement on inflation forecasts. 
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noteworthy, we estimated the Bayesian learning model parameters before and after the 
successful implementation of inflation targeting using Italian forecasts.
18 Figure 9a 
clearly shows that after 1997, there has been a sharp and permanent decline in the 24-
month ahead inflation forecasts and disagreement in Italy. Thus, we split the sample into 
1991-1997 and 1998-2007, and estimate the parameters using the pre- and post-inflation 
target regimes.  
 
As expected, Figure 9b shows that forecast disagreement has become markedly 
lower at all horizons after 1997. The estimates of the relative weights attached to 
incoming news are given in Figure 9c where we find that, on the average, agents attach 
more importance to current news compared to priors under inflation targeting. Thus, the 
enhanced communication strategy of the ECB under inflation targeting combined with 
the ECB’ credibility has made new information more dependable in Italy. Note that at 
certain horizons the updated prior becomes temporarily more important. This is because, 
as Figure 5b shows, forecasters do not update new information every month by the same 
amount, and during the months of relative inactivity in forecast revision, the prior 
becomes relatively more important. Finally, Figure 9d shows how inflation targeting 
affects another parameter of our model – the difference across forecasters in the 
interpretation of new information. Clearly, the disagreement due to heterogeneity in this 
parameter has been significantly reduced at all horizons in the post-1997 period. Thus, 
this case study of Italy shows how inflation targeting not only reduces the variability of 
long-run expectations, but also limits the heterogeneity in how experts interpret new 
information, resulting in reduced disagreement and aggregate forecast errors throughout 
the term structure of forecasts. The existing literature on inflation targeting has only 
considered the effect of targeting on the reduced volatility of long-term mean 
expectations around the desired value.
19 Johnson (2002) is an exception who at least 
recognized the possibility of differential interpretation of public information as a source 
of forecast disagreement.   
 
5. Forecast efficiency 
 
We find that professional forecasters make smaller forecast errors in predicting inflation 
than real GDP, which can partly be explained by the underlying data generating 
processes. Our analysis also reveals that they put more weight on new information while 
forecasting inflation than real GDP. The question is: are these weights efficient? The 
weights will be inefficient if forecasters perceive the relative preciseness of new 
information incorrectly coupled by an undue confidence in their own prior beliefs. One 
                                                 
18 As one referee pointed out, the introduction of inflation targeting was a big policy change, but other 
exogenous changes in pre- and post-1997 in Italy cannot be ruled out as factors behind price stability.   
19 Gurkaynak et al. (2005) and Beechey et al. (2007) studied the sensitivity to new information of inflation 
compensation imbedded in inflation swaps and in the yield spread between long maturity nominal and 
inflation-indexed government bonds. They found that macroeconomic surprises affect inflation 
compensation in the U.S., but not in the inflation targeting countries. For our purpose, note that these 
studies report substantial variability of inflation compensation, much of which remains unexplained in both 
inflation-targeting and non-targeting countries. This unexplained variability in the implied long-run 
inflation expectations can be justified in terms of forecasters having prior distributions on long-run 
expectations with low precisions.    18 
 
possible explanation for the relative superiority of inflation forecasts is that while 
forecasting inflation, forecasters use public information more efficiently, compared to 
real GDP. This possibility is explored formally in this section.  
 
Following equation (4), forecaster i’s estimate of the target variable  t Y , conditional 
on  1 + ith F  and  th L , is given by 
 
         ) )( 1 ( ) , ( 1 1 ith th ith ith ith th ith t L F L F Y E µ λ λ − − + = + + .      ( 1 7 )  
 
Zellner (1988) has shown that the above Bayesian information updating rule is 100% 
efficient, since no information is lost or added when (17) is employed. Thus the weight 
attached to prior belief,  ) /( 1 1 ith ith ith ith b a a + = + + λ , is the efficient weight. However, for 
various reasons, forecasters may not be able to perceive the relative precisions of the 
incoming information compared to the prior, and fail to apply the efficient weight  ith λ  in 
making forecasts. For simplicity, the forecast made by agent i for the target year t and h 
months ahead of the end of target year is assumed also to have the form 
 
) )( 1 ( 1 ith th ith ith ith ith L F F µ δ δ − − + = + ,        ( 1 8 )    
 
where  ith δ  is the actual weight forecaster i attached to his prior belief. We observe that 
forecaster i underweights public information if  ith ith λ δ > .  
 
Combining (17) and (18), Lahiri and Sheng (2008) derived a new test for forecast 
efficiency under the Bayesian learning framework. Their formulation of the efficiency 
test builds on the relation between forecast error and forecast revision as:  
  
) ( ) , ( 1 1 + + − = − ith ith ith th ith ith t F F L F F Y E θ ,         ( 1 9 )    
 
where  ) 1 /( ) ( ith ith ith ith δ λ δ θ − − = . Under the null hypothesis that forecasters use the 
efficient weights (i.e.,  ith ith λ δ = ),  ith θ  should be zero. Since  ith δ  lies between 0 and 1, a 
positive (negative)  ith θ  suggests underweighting (overweighting) public information. The 
intuition behind the relationship is straightforward. Whereas forecast revisions can be 
taken as a measure of how forecasters interpret the importance of public information in 
real time, forecast errors are the ex post “prize” they get as a result of revising their 
forecasts. Suppose that forecasters make large revisions at horizon h but the 
performances of the forecasts do not improve much at that horizon; then one may 
conjecture that forecasters overweight new public information. 
 
To perform the test, we check whether  0 = h θ  in the regression for any specific 
horizon h: 
 
ith ith ith h h ith t F F F Y ε θ α + − + = − + ) ( 1 .        ( 2 0 )    19 
 
 
Following the method in Lahiri and Sheng (2008), we estimate the coefficients in (20) 
using GMM after controlling for both cross-sectional correlation and serial correlation in 
the residuals, using the appropriate weighting matrix. Estimation results are shown in 
Tables 2a and 2b for GDP and inflation forecasts, respectively. Although many estimates 
are not close to zero (particularly for real GDP), given the standard errors of the 
estimates, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of forecast efficiency for more than 
half of horizons and countries. However, evidence also indicates significant forecast 
inefficiency for some countries and horizons. We address this issue below.  
 
For GDP forecasts, we note the following. First, forecasters seem to put more than 
the efficient weight on new public information at very long horizons, as displayed by 
many statistically significant and negative coefficient estimates. Since we find that public 
signals concerning next year’s GDP growth are not very informative during the initial 
eight monthly rounds of forecasting, experts are found to make unnecessary but mostly 
small revisions during this period.
20 Second, we find that forecasters underweight public 
information pretty substantially in the middle horizons. Since, as shown by Isiklar and 
Lahiri (2007), a unit shock has the maximum effect on a target variable in the middle 
horizons, this under-weighting of public information turns out to be very significant. As 
the horizon gets shorter, the base-year GDP growth numbers become available with 
increasing certainty. Furthermore, as we approach the end of the target year, current-year 
GDP announcements and data revisions become part of the target-year GDP growth. As a 
result, forecasters should put a higher weight on the newly arrived public information. 
The degree of underweighting of public information, however, is largest for Canada, 
France and Germany. This finding, based on individual forecasts, complements the recent 
empirical evidence presented by Isiklar et al. (2006). 
 
As for inflation forecasts, the picture is better and shows much less inefficiency both 
quantitatively and by the number of statistically significant parameters. For example, in 
the US, forecasts are inefficient only for 7 out of 24 horizons for inflation, but for 13 
horizons for GDP forecasts. The numbers are very similar for the other six countries. If at 
all, forecasters seem to put more than the efficient weight on new public information at 
very short horizons. In the middle horizons, evidence is mixed. Whereas forecasters 
underweight public information for Canada and Italy, they overweight for Japan and the 
UK in predicting inflation. Note that our tests in (20) were conducted using real time 
actual data. Since data revisions are a lot more formidable in real GDP than in inflation, 
the use of revised actual data would have revealed relatively more inefficiency in real 
GDP forecasts compared to inflation forecasts.  
 
In summary, our analysis shows that, given the Bayesian learning model, there is 
more pervasive stickiness and inefficiency in the recorded real GDP forecasts than in the 
inflation forecasts.  
 
                                                 
20 While analyzing British fixed-target forecasts with horizons pooled up to 12 quarters, Clements (1995) 
also found negative autocorrelations in forecast revisions and interpreted them as evidence of absence of 
significant news over the period. 20 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Based on data on several industrialized countries, we establish that while predicting 
inflation, compared to real GDP, professional forecasters (i) make smaller forecast errors; 
(ii) disagree to a lesser extent; and (iii) begin revising their forecasts much earlier. Even 
though the first of these results has been implicit in most studies of forecast evaluation, 
none of these empirical results are well articulated in the forecasting literature. Yet, as 
Granger (1996) has noted, in order to increase the perceived quality of macro forecasts, 
we should be cognizant of variables that are relatively easy to forecast. 
  
To understand these interesting differences in real GDP and inflation forecasts, we 
first explore the underlying data generating processes for the target variables. Using a 
standard autoregressive model, we find that real GDP should indeed be more difficult to 
forecast; in particular, we find that real GDP forecasts do not have any predictive value 
over naïve benchmarks beyond the 18 month horizon, but for inflation the content 
horizon is around 24 months and even 36 months for some countries.  
 
In reality, the predictability can be improved upon by incorporating additional 
information and using nonlinear models. In that sense, the forecast content from the 
simple autoregressive model provides an overall lower bound on the true predictability of 
a series. To better understand the relative forecasting record of these two macro variables, 
we develop a simple Bayesian learning model aimed at identifying the relative 
importance of alternative pathways through which professional forecasters adapt to new 
information, resulting in different patterns of forecast accuracy over the term structure. In 
our model, forecast disagreement arises from two sources: differences in the initial prior 
beliefs, and differences in the interpretation of public information by forecasters. The 
importance of the second pathway is identified by analyzing the evolution of forecast 
disagreement over horizons, and is a key factor in explaining differential forecast 
accuracy of the two target variables.  
 
We find that diversity in the initial prior beliefs of forecasters explains nearly 100% 
to 40% of the disagreement in GDP forecasts, as the horizon decreases from 24 months to 
1 month. The corresponding numbers are much lower for inflation. The rest of the 
explained forecast disagreement is driven by heterogeneity in the interpretation of new 
information. This empirical finding, together with two case studies on (i) forecast 
disagreement around the 9/11 terrorist attack, and (ii) the inflation targeting experience of 
Italy after 1997, provides strong support for the role of differential interpretation of 
public information in generating expert disagreement in macroeconomic forecasts, and an 
additional explanation of the relative superiority of inflation forecasts over real GDP 
forecasts. We find that a reduction in expert disagreement translates into a corresponding 
reduction in aggregate forecast error.  
 
We explore the possibility that, if forecasters do not use information efficiently 
because they place sub-optimal weights on new information, the forecast content from 
the simple autoregressive model might provide an overall upper bound on the true 
predictability of a series. Following a test for forecast efficiency developed by Lahiri and 21 
 
Sheng (2008) in a Bayesian learning framework, we find that inflation forecasts on the 
whole are more efficient than real GDP forecasts. There is overwhelming evidence that in 
predicting real GDP, professional forecasters significantly underweight public 
information in the middle horizons. For inflation we find very little systematic misuse of 
new information. This evidence can be rationalized by the fact that initial GDP 
announcements are more heavily revised than price indexes, observed only quarterly, and 
involve substantial measurement errors. Our case study on the Italian inflation experience 
in the 1990s shows how inflation targeting policy of its Central Bank reduced forecast 
disagreement and aggregate forecast errors throughout the term structure of forecasts. 
Thus, more frequent communication of the latest inflationary developments to the general 
public and the commitment to long-run price stability by the monetary authorities in our 
sample countries may make adjustments to inflationary expectations more dependent on 
current news, resulting in superior forecasts.  
 
Finally, we should point out that the relative superiority of inflation forecasts 
compared to those of real GDP can also be determined by the demand side of the 
forecasting market, i.e., the professional forecasters may devote more efforts to generate 
better forecasts if their clients demand that way. Indeed, Sinclair et al. (2009) have shown 
that, in the context of a forward-looking Taylor rule as the yardstick for Fed’s monetary 
policy, inflation forecast errors are implicitly considered to be three times more costly 
than those in real GDP. Also, Capistrán and Timmermann (2008) have argued that a 
certain degree of inefficiency in real GDP forecasts compared to inflation can be 
rationalized if clients’ loss functions are asymmetric, and are different between real GDP 
and inflation. Using density forecasts data, Lahiri and Liu (2009) find some evidence to 
this effect, particularly at longer horizons.  
 
It is interesting that as part of the Fed’s major changes in its communication 
strategies, effective September 2007, the horizon of the projections for GDP growth and 
inflation by all FOMC members has been extended from two years to three.
21 We have 
found that currently the real GDP forecasts do not seem to have any value beyond 18 
month horizon. If the demand side of the forecasting market has any effect on forecast 
quality, we may expect that as a result of this change in FOMC policy the content horizon 
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Table 1a. Estimated weights attached to public information in GDP forecasts 
Horizon Canada  France Germany Italy  Japan  UK  US 
1  0.52 0.73 0.35 0.52 0.46 0.49 0.38 
  (0.06)  (0.32)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) 
2  0.46 0.24 0.30 0.18 0.24 0.38 0.41 
  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
3  0.39 0.45 0.34 0.24 0.46 0.31 0.41 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) 
4  0.40 0.20 0.30 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.28 
  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
5  0.24 0.11 0.22 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.37 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
6  0.32 0.54 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.19 0.23 
  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
7  0.31 0.32 0.21 0.28 0.13 0.19 0.21 
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
8  0.17 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.34 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
9  0.16 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.21 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
10  0.22 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.15 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
11  0.14 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.01 0.07 0.24 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
12  0.17 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.19 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
13  0.23 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.17 
  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
14  0.12 0.05 0.28 0.24 0.03 0.10 0.12 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
15  0.22 0.21 0.14 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.12 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
16  0.05 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.13 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
17  0.17 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.09 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
18  0.09 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.04 0.08 0.16 
  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
19  0.08 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.05 
  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
20  0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.10 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
21  0.07 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.03 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
22  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.05 0.13 
    (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 26 
 
Table 1b. Estimated weight attached to public information in inflation forecasts 
Horizon Canada  France Germany Italy  Japan  UK  US 
1  0.58 0.36 0.42 0.55 0.41 0.53 0.49 
  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
2  0.37 0.41 0.52 0.37 0.39 0.27 0.57 
  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
3  0.74 0.65 0.45 0.44 0.52 0.40 0.33 
  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
4  0.42 0.31 0.44 0.27 0.33 0.65 0.45 
  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.04) 
5  0.50 0.24 0.42 0.26 0.24 0.34 0.47 
  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) 
6  0.37 0.31 0.40 0.33 0.43 0.33 0.34 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
7  0.34 0.31 0.36 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.31 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
8  0.33 0.23 0.33 0.15 0.28 0.31 0.39 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
9  0.23 0.48 0.26 0.31 0.42 0.27 0.27 
  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) 
10  0.26 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.12 0.34 0.19 
  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
11  0.22 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.24 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
12  0.30 0.25 0.19 0.34 0.22 0.27 0.18 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
13  0.10 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.13 
  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
14  0.14 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.07 0.24 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
15  0.12 0.31 0.23 0.53 0.25 0.10 0.15 
  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03) (0.22) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
16  0.14 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.14 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
17  0.16 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.14 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
18  0.15 0.22 0.11 0.33 0.19 0.08 0.11 
  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
19  0.17 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.12 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
20  0.04 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
21  0.10 0.24 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.11 0.11 
  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
22  0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.06 
    (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 27 
 
Table 2a. Test of efficiency in the use of public information in GDP forecasts 
Horizon Canada  France Germany Italy  Japan  UK  US 
1 -0.17  0.01  0.11 -0.10 0.21* -0.18* 0.61* 
  (-1.37)  (0.11)  (0.76) (-1.04) (2.29) (-2.09) (3.61) 
2  0.67* 0.39 1.03* 0.02 -0.23 -0.33* -0.30* 
  (3.44)  (1.72)  (5.01) (0.14) (-1.25) (-3.08) (-2.41) 
3 0.14  0.19  0.63* 0.28* 0.02 -0.14 -0.16 
  (1.27)  (1.46)  (3.33) (2.62) (0.25) (-1.62) (-1.37) 
4  0.29* 0.09 0.72* 0.41* 0.10 0.16 -0.14 
  (2.38)  (0.57)  (6.03) (2.20) (0.86) (1.83) (-1.07) 
5 0.13  0.18  1.00* 0.48 -0.18 0.24* -0.30* 
  (0.54)  (0.53)  (5.61) (1.80) (-0.82) (2.68) (-2.72) 
6 0.00  0.10  1.16* 0.08 0.06 0.10 -0.13 
  (0.02)  (0.77)  (6.15) (0.64) (0.62) (1.16) (-0.86) 
7  0.47* 0.30* 0.38* -0.01 -0.25 0.96* 0.34* 
  (4.12)  (2.29)  (2.59) (-0.09) (-1.45) (5.79) (2.56) 
8  0.68* 1.06* 0.43* 0.26 0.41 0.48* 0.21* 
  (2.63)  (4.38)  (2.28) (1.07) (1.06) (3.12) (2.27) 
9 0.60*  0.87*  0.32 0.03 0.77* 0.49* 0.27* 
  (3.03)  (5.12)  (1.23) (0.12) (4.27) (3.24) (2.04) 
10 1.01*  1.38*  0.09 0.16 -0.15 0.40* 0.09 
  (5.27)  (6.59)  (0.52) (0.69) (-0.66) (2.20) (0.70) 
11  1.74* 1.25* 0.82* 0.62* 0.18 1.12* 0.50* 
  (6.01)  (4.03)  (3.63) (2.53) (0.45) (5.43) (5.23) 
12  0.89* 0.84* 0.95* 0.29 0.23 0.85* 0.45* 
  (3.74)  (3.22)  (4.56) (1.20) (1.19) (5.22) (2.82) 
13  0.78* 0.74* 0.84* 0.34 0.01 0.09 0.96* 
  (2.33)  (2.76)  (4.49) (1.36) (0.03) (0.51) (4.99) 
14 -0.23  1.05*  0.99* 0.56* 0.10 -0.12 0.25 
  (-0.56)  (2.85)  (4.81) (2.08) (0.34) (-0.61) (1.29) 
15 -0.68*  0.37  1.21* 0.63* -0.09 0.51* -0.39* 
  (-2.64)  (1.78)  (5.02) (2.94) (-0.44) (2.82) (-2.63) 
16 -0.90*  0.72*  0.92* 0.01 0.12 0.38 0.59* 
  (-2.42)  (2.14)  (2.85) (0.02) (0.49) (1.55) (3.31) 
17 0.48  1.92*  1.03* 1.25* 0.15 -0.38 0.06 
  (0.98)  (2.45)  (2.92) (2.44) (0.33) (-1.52) (0.23) 
18 1.02  -0.98*  0.03 -0.13 0.14 0.19 0.70* 
  (1.75)  (-2.78)  (0.09) (-0.38) (0.43) (0.74) (2.19) 
19  -0.80 -2.07* -0.15 -0.22 -0.74 -0.11 0.73 
  (-1.92)  (-6.42)  (-0.38) (-0.57) (-1.65) (-0.36) (1.81) 
20 1.56*  -1.23*  -0.47 -0.46 -0.99 0.00 -0.02 
  (3.25)  (-2.11)  (-1.16) (-0.89) (-1.76) (0.01) (-0.06) 
21  0.08 0.61 0.51 0.40 -0.18 0.20 -0.13 
  (0.17)  (1.12)  (1.47) (0.72) (-0.40) (0.63) (-0.39) 
22 -0.28  -0.78  0.01 -1.73* 0.89* -0.01 -0.52 
  (-0.49)  (-1.73)  (0.04) (-3.43) (2.07) (-0.01) (-1.49) 
23  -0.69 -0.29 -0.27 -0.70 0.28 -0.39 -0.73* 
   (-1.65)  (-0.49)  (-0.69) (-1.34) (0.42) (-1.12) (-2.57) 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. A single * denotes that the estimated values 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2b. Test of efficiency in the use of public information in inflation forecasts 
Horizon Canada  France Germany Italy  Japan  UK  US 
1 -0.09  -0.05  -0.15* -0.43* -0.28* 0.22* -0.17* 
  (-1.39)  (-0.54)  (-2.22) (-7.06) (-4.07) (3.01) (-3.39) 
2 -0.27*  0.06  -0.01 -0.10 -0.31* -0.12 0.00 
  (-3.24)  (0.59)  (-0.08) (-1.16) (-3.83) (-1.04) (-0.05) 
3 -0.14*  0.02  0.21* -0.09 -0.09 -0.31* -0.17* 
  (-2.02)  (0.26)  (3.84) (-1.14) (-1.49) (-3.43) (-2.39) 
4 0.00  0.26*  0.18* -0.53* -0.11 0.02 0.05 
  (0.01)  (2.44)  (2.13) (-5.34) (-1.25) (0.26) (0.67) 
5 0.22  -0.15  0.04 -0.38* -0.22 -0.08 -0.24* 
  (1.91)  (-0.89)  (0.41) (-2.71) (-1.61) (-0.79) (-3.21) 
6  -0.14 -0.23 -0.03 0.09 -0.23* -0.42* -0.01 
  (-1.34)  (-1.96)  (-0.30) (0.96) (-3.22) (-5.42) (-0.12) 
7 -0.05  -0.12  0.05 0.37* 0.01 0.02 0.15 
  (-0.46)  (-0.95)  (0.68) (2.88) (0.07) (0.27) (1.76) 
8  0.39* 0.02 0.22* 0.55* -0.09 -0.19* 0.19* 
  (2.74)  (0.09)  (2.18) (3.10) (-0.81) (-2.08) (2.50) 
9 0.26*  -0.02  0.07 0.70* -0.34* -0.02 0.38* 
  (2.01)  (-0.12)  (0.49) (4.68) (-4.20) (-0.33) (3.55) 
10 0.17  0.38*  0.34* 0.54* -0.25 -0.36* 0.16 
  (1.51)  (2.63)  (3.08) (3.60) (-1.79) (-4.73) (1.16) 
11 -0.14  -0.02  0.07 0.59* -0.47* 0.25 -0.13 
  (-0.76)  (-0.14)  (0.53) (2.86) (-3.29) (1.88) (-0.89) 
12 -0.09  0.13  -0.58* 0.28 -0.32* 0.10 -0.45* 
  (-0.49)  (0.85)  (-4.00) (1.33) (-2.12) (1.16) (-2.96) 
13 -0.21  -0.07  0.05 0.93* -0.01 -0.29* -0.16 
  (-0.88)  (-0.36)  (0.33) (2.83) (-0.08) (-3.29) (-0.91) 
14 0.55*  -0.11  -0.06 0.66* -0.50* -0.06 -0.35* 
  (2.03)  (-0.45)  (-0.46) (2.25) (-3.33) (-0.45) (-2.55) 
15  0.01 0.02 0.27 -0.77* -0.13 -0.74* -0.17 
  (0.03)  (0.16)  (1.73) (-6.78) (-1.07) (-7.54) (-1.12) 
16 -0.16  0.29  0.25 0.31 0.06 0.08 -0.06 
  (-0.73)  (1.35)  (1.45) (1.43) (0.48) (0.76) (-0.35) 
17 0.76*  0.12  -0.21 0.13 -0.33 0.93* 0.05 
  (2.19)  (0.37)  (-1.05) (0.46) (-1.09) (5.27) (0.31) 
18 0.43  -0.47*  -0.37* 0.30 0.03 0.05 -0.10 
  (1.16)  (-2.45)  (-2.11) (1.22) (0.18) (0.27) (-0.49) 
19 -0.23  -0.34  0.12 0.64 0.24 0.16 -0.07 
  (-0.79)  (-1.31)  (0.65) (1.65) (1.07) (0.84) (-0.37) 
20  0.05 0.03 0.28 0.86 -0.33 0.25 0.15 
  (0.12)  (0.06)  (1.31) (1.61) (-1.33) (1.20) (0.64) 
21  -0.21 -0.13 -0.31 -0.28 -0.03 0.17 -0.28 
  (-0.63)  (-0.44)  (-1.24) (-0.91) (-0.13) (1.18) (-1.00) 
22 -0.25  0.05  -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.22 
  (-0.84)  (0.16)  (-0.70) (0.10) (0.00) (-0.58) (-0.82) 
23 0.75  0.08  -0.16 -0.40 -0.36 0.29 -0.35 
   (1.58)  (0.23)  (-0.61) (-0.98) (-1.46) (1.11) (-1.24) 
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. A single * denotes that the estimated values 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1.  RMSEs in real GDP (solid line) and inflation forecasts (dotted line) 
   
 
   
 





Figure 2. Forecast disagreement in GDP (solid line) and inflation (dotted line) 
   
 
   
 





Figure 3a. GDP forecast revision: between-agent variation (bottom line), within-agent 
variation (middle line), total variation (top line) 
   
 
   
 




Figure 3b. Inflation forecast revision: between-agent variation (bottom line), within-agent 
variation (middle line), total variation (top line) 
   
 
   
 




























Figure 5. Predictability of GDP (solid line) and inflation forecasts (dotted line)  
based on real time information set 
   
 
   
 



























Figure 7. Contribution of differences in the initial prior beliefs in explaining GDP (solid 
line) and inflation (dotted line) forecast disagreement 
   
 
   
 












Note: The horizontal axis shows the month/year when forecasts were made. The graph 
plots forecast disagreement for the target year (solid line) against a benchmark 


















Figure 9a. Disagreement in 24-month ahead inflation forecasts over time 
 
 
Figure 9b. Disagreement in inflation forecasts over horizons  
 
 
Figure 9c. Weights attached to public information 
 
 
Figure 9d. Variance across forecasters in interpreting public information  
 
 